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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
all courts had awarded custody to the Commissioner, the Children's Court wished
the Commissioner to acquaint the child with the benefits of the operation,18
whereas the Appellate Division would have required the operation.
The child in question is now fourteen years old. He believes, as does his
father, who opposed the operation, that his hairlip and deft palate can be cured
only by "forces in the universe," and that any surgery would have to be com-
pletely undone in order to effect a cure. The Court of Appeals held,19 that under
the circumstances the trial court's discretion should be respected, since the trial
court had first hand knowledge of the facts and could best be relied on for an
equitable decision. The Children's Court has jurisdiction to order such an oper-
ation,2° but it believed more harm would result to the child than would be
obviated by it because of the boy's mental attitude.21
The dissenters in the Court of Appeals believed that the majority was over-
looking the main point of the case: that the child was (and is) "neglected" accord-
ing to the law, and the child's wishes are irrelevant. The child's acquiescence in his
parent's neglect does not "render it permissible." As did the Appellate Division,22
the dissenters apparently overlook the fact that the statute provides that "the
court in its discretion . . . may cause any person within its jurisdiction to be
examined," 23 and "... a suitable order may be made for the treatment ... of such
child. .. ,24 (emphasis supplied).
Religioies Upbringing of Children
In an appeal from an order modifying a judgment of separation, eliminating
a condition that the child be brought up in the Roman Catholic religion and
instead directing the child be permitted to attend the church of his own choice,
and further, if he so chose, to transfer from the parochial school he was then
attending to a public school, the modification was upheld, per curiam; Judges
Desmond and Conway dissenting.25
The wife, a Christian Scientist, had entered into an antenuptial agreement to
bring up all children in the faith of her husband, a Roman Catholic. In 1949 the
18. Once acquainted with its advantages, the boy may decide for himself to
undergo the operation.
19. 309 N. Y. 80, 127 N. E. 2d 820 (1955).
20. N. Y. Children's Court Act § 2 (4), which grants Children's Court juris-
diction of neglected children. A neglected child is defined as one whose parents
refuse to provide necessary medical or surgical care.
21. Note 17, supra.
22. Note 16, supra.
23. N. Y. CHILDREN'S CouRT AcT § 24.
24. Ibid.
25. Martin v. Martin, 308 N. Y. 136, 123 N. E. 2d 812 (954).
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wife was granted a judgment of separation, and awarded custody of the child on
condition that he be raised in accordance with the antenuptial agreement.
Admitting violation of this condition, the wife requested modification "for the
best interests and welfare" of the child. The child, twelve years old at the time
of the hearing, testified as to his own wishes on the matter. The Court of Appeals
held that, ample evidence being available that the child could testify intelligently,
the modification was justified.
The problem of how to treat antenuptial agreements for religious unbringing
being a somewhat sensitive one, the issue has seldom been squarely faced in
American courts. English courts have refused to enforce these agreements, but on
grounds not applicable in this country.26 American courts have generally held the
agreements unenforcable,2 7 although a few have indicated a willingness to uphold
the agreements, procedural or other difficulties having prevented it in the instant
case.28 In New York three cases, all decided by Fowler, S., have placed a strong
emphasis on religious upbringing, but none went so far as to enforce such an
agreement.29
Basically, it would seem difficult to effect enforcement of these agreements.3 0
Monetary damages are neither a satisfactory nor a legally proper remedy.a'
Specific performance is impractical, since the law cannot control the day-to-day
home training of the child, although formal training might be controlled in this
manner. Divorce and other remedies dealing with the marital status are of
doubtful benefit in solving the problem of the child, and because of religious
convictions are very frequently valueless to the aggrieved parent. Custody of the
child might be effective in the applicable cases,3 2 but numerous other factors, even
beyond the obvious one of causing the marital breach, make this a poor choice83
26. In England, especially prior to the Statute of 1886, the father had an
absolute right to determine the religion of the child, regardless of agreements to
the contrary. Andrews v. Salt, Law. Rep. 8 Ch. App. 622 (1873), In Re Nevin,
Law. Rep. 2 Ch. 299 (1891). Even after this statute, which eliminated this
absolute right, the rule continued to have its effect in modified form. In Re Story,
2 Ir. R. 328, 50 Ir. L. T. 123 (1916).
27. Brewer v. Cary, 148 Mo. App. 193, 127 S. W. 685 (1910); Denton v. James,
107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac. 307 (1920). See annot. 12 A. L. R. 1153.
28. In Re Luck, 10 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 1 (1900).
29. Matter of Wagner, 75 Misc. 419, 135 N. Y. Supp. 678 (1912); Matter of
Lamb, 139 N. Y. Supp. 685 (1912); In Re Mancini, 89 Misc. 83, 151 N. Y. Supp 387
(1915).
30. For a full discussion of the problems of enforcement, see 50 YALE L. J.
1286 (1941).
31. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1340A (rev. ed. 1936). Contra, RESTATEMENT,
CONTRAcrs §341 (1932), which would allow monetary damages for mental disturb-
ance from breach of contract where it is apparent from the contract that such
mental disturbance would inevitably arise from a breach.
32. Cases frequently arise when one spouse is deceased and the survivor Is
breaching the agreement, or in other situations when custody is not an Issue.
33. E.g., the mother is generally preferred as guardian, other things being
equal; Abeles v. Abeles, 164 Misc. 418, 299 N. Y. Supp 206 (1937).
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The dissent in the instant case, replyiig both on prior decisions34 and the
"clean hands" doctrine, bitterly attacked the value of the testimony of a twelve
year old in a matter of this sort. Although this position is better founded in strict
legal principles, the majority has probably made a more practical compromise with
reality. To uphold the agreement would then have forced the court to admit its
unenforcability. However harsh the decision may have been on these parties,
in fact no more could have been granted the husband by any decision. The legal
denouncing of these agreements as unenforcable would have the effect of
wreaking havoc upon a fundamental principle behind innumerable mixed mar-
riages,3 5 without any legal benefit.
INSURANCE
Contract to Assign Policy
In New York every contract to assign or assignment of a life insurance
policy, or promise to name a beneficiary of any such policy, is void unless in
writing and subscribed by the party to be charged.' In Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co.,2 plaintiff, wife of deceased insured, alleged that she and her husband orally
agreed that he should take out a policy on his life, naming her as beneficiary. This
he did, and then delivered the policy to her. She alleged also that deceased
surreptitiously took the policy from plaintiff's possession and made his sister
beneficiary. Plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to the life insurance proceeds
as the beneficiary under a constructive trust which she desired to be placed upon
the proceeds. The Court, reversing the order of the Appellate Division,3 held, that
the action was not barred by the Statute of Frauds; 4 a constructive trust could be
imposed if plaintiff proved the facts alleged.
Plaintiff in this case paid at least a substantial part of the premiums each
year, paid the burial expenses and had in large part supported her husband for
several years during his illness. The majority believed that, assuming the facts
34. The cases relied upon by the dissent, Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N. Y. 391, 83
N. E. 2d 848 (1949), and Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N. Y. 294, 183 N. E. 429(1932), are actually somewhat distant from the issues, and themselves rely on
rather unstable authority. However, they do constitute at least some precedent,
whereas there is no direct precedent available in this state for the majority
ruling.
35. Although dispensation for mixed marriages by Catholics is left to the
individual Bishops, Codex Juris Canonici (1918) Canons 1040, almost all dioceses
require such antenuptial agreements.
1. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §31, subd. 9 (Statute of Frauds).
2. 309 N. Y. 197, 128 N. E. 2d 307 (1955).
3. 285 App. Div. 446, 137 N. Y. S. 2d 583 (1st Dep't 1955), in which court
granted summary judgment to defendant, and dismissed the complaint.
4, Note 1, supra,
